1. Field of the Invention (Technical Field)
The present invention relates to security systems for monitoring and detecting threats from toxic or dangerous substances, including biological and chemical activity and threats, in a timely manner to allow for taking effective responsive measures to forestall or mitigate the implied threat to humans, animals, economies, etc., and in combination with such detection to the management and monitoring of the transportation of goods in response to such threats.
2. Background Art
Monitoring biological activity has historically been a rather ad hoc process. Virtually all extant monitoring systems rely on networks of health professionals to identify and report animal and human disease outbreaks. At the global and regional scale, organizations (e.g., the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the International Red Cross, the United State's Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and USDA APHIS National Center for Animal Health Surveillance) attempt to monitor the status of animal and human diseases and health but their efforts are slow, reactive, and heavily reliant on spotty infrastructure and unreliable human commitment.
The outbreak of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in China's Guangdong province in 2003 demonstrates the inadequacy of relying on networks of health professionals in a fast paced, highly mobile, global community. The corona virus responsible for SARS was apparently endemic to the Guangdong region's animal population, but it was not possible to detect any anomaly that would have provided an alert as to when it had entered the human population. Even in the absence of human morbidity and fatalities, it would not likely have been part of the historic background “noise” accompanying the stew of human pathogens routinely present in the region.
Typically, the places most vulnerable to problems from diseases and to threats from hazardous substances are those that have the fewest resources to apply to such problems. But even the relatively more affluent, resource rich places with the financial and personnel resources to deal with threats often cannot intervene with those resources quickly enough to be truly effective. For example, the typical approach is to look for sick animals and sick people, but by the time those are detected, it is generally too late for truly proactive measures, particularly when, for example, pathogens are novel.
To monitor diseases, hazardous substances, and their threats more effectively, there is a need for a monitoring system that is virtually everywhere, provides information that is location specific, delivers essentially real-time data, does not rely on overt human intervention at detection points, and is relatively inexpensive to implement and maintain.
Such threats are of particular concern with respect to the transportation of goods. The essentially random arrival of freight at Mexico/US border crossings (as well as other border crossings) creates problems similar to those that would occur if international airline flights arrived randomly at international airports with no warning and inadequate documentation of their origins. When traffic arrives at border crossings, it is visually inspected (or temporarily held and visually inspected). Assuming no problems are detected during the inspection and/or holding period, traffic is passed for travel into Mexico or the United States. Consequently, every hour of every day animals (and people) that have diseases, but are asymptomatic, move through the border without incident.
Traffic scheduling by border authorities to eliminate or minimize congestion does not exist. Attempts to document the origin and destination of livestock shipments are relatively recent, far from comprehensive, and essentially of little value. Improvements in the bill-of-lading procedures have been proposed by agricultural officials but have not been adopted to date. Given the paucity of origin-destination information, lack of real-time bio-mapping, and in the final analysis, any real infrastructural capacity to respond, the isolation by point of origin to minimize cross contamination is not viable.
To ensure that the border is both secure and open in at least one location virtually all of the time, an alternative and substantially different physical layout from the current “line in the sand” is needed. Such an alternative system must incorporate a capacity for ready implementation of the newest of a wide array of rapidly developing security technologies, and it must simultaneously overcome the issues of congestion and delays while providing a high level of security.